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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 20070874-CA

v.
SHAWN DAVID LARSON,
Defendant/Appellant.
JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from guilty pleas to three counts of aggravated robbery
(enhanced), a first degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
§ 78A-4-103(2)(j) (2008).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Did the trial court properly deny defendant's 120-day disposition
motion to dismiss where the record shows that good cause supported
the delay that pushed defendant's proceedings beyond the 120-day
disposition period?
This Court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss under the 120-day

disposition statute for abuse of discretion. See State v. Houston, 2003 UT App 416, \ 7,
82 P.3d 219. This Court "'will find abuse of discretion only where there is no reasonable
basis in the record to support the trial court's Speedy Trial Statute determination of "good
cause.'"" Id. (citations omitted).

II.

May this Court reach defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel
claim where he did not raise that claim below or reserve that claim
when he entered his Sery pleas?
No standard of review applies to this issue.
STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutes, attached at Addendum A, are relevant to this appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 10,2003, defendant was charged with eleven counts of enhanced

aggravated robbery and one count of possession of a firearm by a restricted person (R. 16). On May 1, 2003, a preliminary hearing was scheduled for June 10,2003 (R. 19-20).
On May 5, 2003, the Utah State Prison received a Notice and Request for Disposition of
Pending Charge(s) filed by defendant (R. 21).
After numerous continuances, a preliminary hearing was held on October 8,2003
(R. 42-45). The trial court found sufficient evidence to bind defendant over on the
underlying charges but not the enhancements. (Id). On October 20, 2003, the State filed
an amended information (R. 48-50, 51-55).
Following defendant's arraignment, a three-day trial was set to begin on November
18,2003 (R. Tab 409:Tab4:l-2). After numerous continuances to allow defense counsel
time to prepare for trial, trial was reset to begin June 8,2004 (R. 413:3-6, 21; R. 56, 5961,105-07).
2

On May 24, 2004, defendant told the trial court that he was dissatisfied with
appointed counsel and wanted to hire private counsel (R. 129-31; R. 414:3-5, 9-10).
When, in June, defendant had not yet retained new counsel, the trial court referred the
matter back to the public defender's office for appointment of conflict counsel (R.
409:Tab7:l-2).
On July 14,2004, conflict counsel appeared (R. 409:Tab 8:1). Shortly thereafter,
counsel filed a motion to dismiss under the 120-day disposition statute (R. 158-59, 16162). After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion (R. 417:3-7,
11; R. 222-23). Trial was reset for December 7,2004 (R. 417:8; R. 224-26).
On November 29,2004, defendant again informed the court that he wanted to
retain private counsel (R. 419:3-4). On December 10,2004, the State filed a second
amended information (R. 262-68,269-75). Following several continuances to allow
defendant to secure private counsel, new defense counsel entered his appearance on
January 18, 2004 (R. 292-93, 320-21, 324).
On January 24, 2005, defense counsel indicated that the parties may have reached
a resolution of the case and asked for a brief continuance (Jan. 24, 2005 Tr. at 4-5).
On February 14, 2005, defendant entered Sery pleas to three counts of aggravated
robbery (R. 420 (transcript); R. 330-32, 336-43). As part of his plea agreement,
defendant reserved the right to challenge the trial court's 120-day disposition ruling on
appeal (R. 420:4).
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On August 4,2005, defendant was sentenced to three consecutive terms of sixyears-to-life (R. 345-46).
On November 8,2005, defendant filed a Manning motion to reinstate his right to
appeal, which the trial court denied (R. 349-53, 359-60). On appeal, the parties stipulated
to a summary reversal of the trial court's order. See State v. Larson, 2007 UT App 165U
(per curiam). This Court reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the matter to the
trial court. See id. On remand, the State stipulated to defendant's Manning motion, and
the trial court granted it (R. 435-36,439). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R.
441-42). The supreme court transferred the matter to this Court for disposition (R. 448).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The crimes.1 On April 2, 2002, after having been released on parole on an
aggravated robbery conviction, defendant entered a Crown Burger restaurant with a firiend
(R. 334 (PSI) at 3-6). Both were wearing beanies over their heads and/or bandanas over
their faces (R. 411:10,20,29, 37,44-45, 59, 64, 72; PSI at 3-5). One was brandishing a
gun; the other was brandishing a "long" knife (R. 411:10-11, 14-15, 21, 29, 31, 37,40,
42,45,49, 51, 53, 55, 59, 60, 64, 69, 80).
Inside the restaurant, defendant went to an office at the back of the store (PSI at
3). There, he approached the two owners of the restaurant, held a gun to their faces, and

because defendant entered guilty pleas pursuant to a plea bargain before trial, the
facts of the crimes are taken from the preliminary hearing transcript and defendant's
presentence investigation report (PSI).
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demanded that they open the store safe (R. 411:64-65, 70-71; PSI at 3, 6). In the safe was
some $20,000 in cash and $100,000 in jewelry (R. 411:65, 70-72; PSI at 3, 6-7, 9).
Defendant took the cash and jewelry, as well as the female owner's purse (R. 411:65, 7071; PSI at 3).
Meanwhile, defendant's friend corralled the restaurant's employees and customers,
ten people in total, into the dining area (R. 411:9,20, 22,26, 30-31, 37-38,45, 51, 59; PSI
at 4-5). Threatening anyone who did not listen, the man told everyone to "[g]et on the
floor" and "[e]mpty [their] pockets" (R. 411:21, 24, 31, 38-39,45, 51-52, 59; PSI at 4-5).
At one point, the man in front called back to defendant and walked back to the
office (R. 411:12,17,23, 26-27, 39-40,46, 55-56; PSI at 4). As he did, one of the
victims ran out of the restaurant to a nearby store and called the police (R. 411:13, 26,40,
55; PSI at 4). The man then returned with a gun and collected the "wallet[s], money,
keys, [and] credit cards" that lay on the floor (R. 411:21,40,42,49, 52, 56, 60; PSI at 45). He and defendant then ran out the restaurant's back door (R. 411:27, 34,41,49, 56,
71-72; PSI at 3-4, 6).
Outside, the two men approached a waiting vehicle in the parking lot (R. 411:7980; PSI at 3-4). One of the men pointed a gun at the driver and ordered him out of the car
(R. 411:80; PSI at 3). As the driver got out, the man with the gun told him to "[t]hrow
[the] keys back in the car" (R. 411:81). The driver complied and then ran to the back
door of the restaurant, where the male owner let him in (R. 411:81). Defendant and his
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friend then got into the vehicle, while the male owner of the restaurant retrieved his
pistol from a filing cabinet (R. 411:73; PSI at 3-4). Several shots where fired, and the
man on the passenger side of the vehicle fled (R. 411:73-74; PSI at 3-4, 6). Defendant
later reported that a bullet must have come through the windshield because "he was hit
with a piece of lead in the face" (PSI at 6).
The stolen vehicle was found later with bullet holes "through the windshield, the
hood and one in the front driver's side fender" (PSI at 5). Several wallets, loose cash, and
some 9mm casings were found inside the vehicle (Id.). In addition, the passenger side of
the vehicle had "a blood mark on the right side and blood drops on the seat, the side panel
and the ground" (Id.). Samples of the blood were collected for DNA testing and
subsequently matched to defendant (Id.). Neither defendant nor hisfriend,however, were
immediately apprehended.
A short while later, police received information from an anonymous source
identifying defendant and a man named Joseph Sanchez as the perpetrators of the Crown
Burger robbery (PSI at 5). At the time, defendant was already back in prison on a parole
violation (Id.).
Defendant's disposition motion. The following events occurred between May 5,
2003, the date on which defendant's 120-disposition notice was received, and August 13,
2004, the date on which the trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss under the
Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (the UMDDA):
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June 10,2003 - Defense counsel moves to continue the preliminary hearing (R.
409:1). Defense counsel explains that "we talked about this on Monday and
figured that with eleven witnesses plus the discussion this morning
(inaudible), we're going to ask for a special setting" (Id). The prosecutor
indicates she could be ready in "two weeks, possibly a week" (Id). When
the magistrate suggests a hearing date of June 24, the prosecutor states that
she "can't do that" because she had "a trial four days" that week (Id. at 2).
When the magistrate offers July 3, both the prosecutor and defense counsel
indicate July 3 "works" (Id; R. 24-25).
July 2,2003 - Preliminary hearing continued to July 14, 2003 (Docket at 7). No
indication in record concerning who requested the continuance.
July 14,2003 - Defense counsel moves to continue the preliminary hearing
because "the federal government is deciding whether or not they want to
charge this" (R. 409:Tab 2:1). The prosecutor states that she has "been
pretty aggressive with the U.S. Attorney's office to try to get them to make
a decision" and that she "will call [the] U.S. Attorney... again today" (Id.).
The hearing is rescheduled for July 28, 2003 (Id; R. 27).
July 28,2003 - Defense counsel moves again for a continuance "to see whether or
not the federal government [is] going to file charges" because, "[i]f they
[are], the State [is] going to dismiss on this" (R. 409:Tab 3:1). Thus,
counsel continues, "what we both decided is we just need to set this for a
preliminary hearing" and asks for "a special setting" (Id.). The prosecutor
again states that she has "been diligently trying to get an answerfromthe
U.S. Attorney's Office and I'm going to continue to do that" (Id.). The
magistrate indicates that "I can't give you a definite time until October, but
I only have one jury set on August 27th and I'll know by the 18th whether
that's going or not" (R. 409:Tab 3:2). Counsel and the magistrate agree to
retain the dates of both August 27 and October 8, "just in case" (R. 409:Tab
3:2-3; R. 28-29).
Aug. 27,2003 - Defense counsel fails to appear for the preliminary hearing (R.
410:3). The magistrate calls counsel's office and learns that counsel
"doesn't have this down on the calendar," even though he "was here when
this was set" (R. 410:5). After approximately 15 minutes, the magistrate
holds defense counsel in contempt and strikes the hearing (R. 410:5-6; R.
30-32, 35-39). The magistrate notes that defense counsel's absence "has
delayed proceedings that have affected the court and all of th[e twelve
7

witnesses] . . . and I find that that has interfered with judicial process" (R.
410:6). The magistrate tells defendant that, although "you are entitled to a
speedy trial[,]... I'm not going to count this against the State for failure to
try the case because it's your attorney's fault that it's delayed" (R. 410:6-7).
When defendant asks, "How can I be held to account for another person
when I have no power over him?," the magistrate responds, "It's a good
question" but, "if you need an attorney, we wouldn't presume to try to get
you to go to court without one" (R. 410:7). Preliminary hearing reset for
October 8, 2003 (R. 31).
Oct. 8,2003 - Preliminary hearing held (R. 42-45), The trial court finds sufficient
evidence to bind defendant over on the underlying charges but not the
enhancements (Id.). On October 20, 2003, the State files amended
information (R. 48-50, 51-55).
Oct. 20,2003 - At defendant's arraignment hearing, defense counsel indicates the
trial will take three days (R. 409:Tab 4:1). When the trial court suggests
dates in mid-November, defense counsel responds, "[m]y only concern is
that he has filed 120 day disposition on this case. I'm free on those dates"
(Id.). After a brief discussion concerning when defendant's notice was filed
and noting that 120 days had already passed from the date of the filing, trial
set for November 18-20, 2003 (R. 409:Tab 4:1-2).
Nov. 7,2003 - Defense counsel files written motion to continue trial to which the
State stipulates (R. 56).
Nov. 10,2003 - At the pretrial conference hearing, defense counsel argues
his motion to continue. Counsel notes that "this was set pretty quickly
because [defendant] at the time had filed a 120-day disposition" (R.
412:3)." However, "[t]his case boils down to basically DNA . . . and I'm
going to need to have some time to get all the results from the State and
have an expert look at those" (Id.). Defense counsel states that defendant
agrees to the continuance (R. 412:3-4). When the court comments,
"[u]nless any charges can be dismissed for the 120 days," defense counsel
notes that "I have gone back over and looked at the docket and there's been
some—quite a few continuances but most of them either have been agreed
to by us or were asked by us, and including the one of them which was my
fault
So I don't think there's any ground for the 120-day disposition
(Id.). The trial court then addresses defendant, stating that "I will only
continue [the trial] if you are willing to waive any right you have to a
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speedy trial and you agree not to raise any more issues regarding this 120day disposition" (R. 412:5). When defendant asks "[h]ow many days is it
that we have in favor for my behalf with the 120 days," defense counsel
responds, "all I can tell you is that almost every continuance we've had we
agreed to it so every time appearing after that doesn't count toward the 120
days" (Id). Defendant responds, "I understand, I'd like to waive my
right" (Id.). When the trial court warns defendant that a continuance would
mean no 'trial date until sometime after the first of the year," defendant
confirms his waiver (Id). After defense counsel indicates he is not
available for trial during the court's open dates in February, trial is set for
March 24-26,2004 (R. 412:6; R. 59-61). Defense counsel informs the
court that defendant "just told me that's okay" (R. 412:6).
Nov. 24,2003 - Defense counsel files discovery request for information related to
DNA evidence (R. 72-73). On or about December 4,2003, defense counsel
subpoenas DNA information from Utah State Crime Lab (R. 76-77).
Jan. 13,2004 - Defendant is paroled from the Utah State Prison and booked
into jail on current charges (R. 409:Tab 5:1; R. 81-82; PSI at 7).
Feb. 10,2004 - Defense counsel files a written motion to continue trial to allow
DNA expert sufficient time to review material in this case (R. 97-98, 101).
Feb. 20,2004 - Defense counsel argues his motion to continue, stating that he
just received the necessary supplemental datafromthe crime lab and his
DNA expert needs more time to prepare for trial (R. 413:11-13, 14). The
prosecutor objects to a continuance (R. 413:13). Defendant then confirms
he is "willing to waive his speedy trial rights" (R. 413:15). Defense counsel
states he understands the trial might be pushed back to June (R. 413:15).
When defendant states that he does not waive any speedy trial rights that
have already accumulated but only "anythingfromthis point on," the court
states, "Well, then, we're not going to continue the trial" (R. 413: 16).
After further discussion, defendant waives his right to a speedy trial (R.
413:16-21). Trial is continued to June 8-10,2004 (R. 413:21-22; R. 107).
May 24,2004 - At the pretrial conference, defendant tells the court that he is
dissatisfied with defense counsel's failure to file a motion to dismiss under
the UMDDA and that he wants to hire a private attorney (R. 414:3-5). The
court explains that "you just need to understand that the 120-day detainer
disposition is gone.... You've waived every time we've talked to you
9

about continuing this trial, so that's not an issue" (R. 414:6). Defendant
responds, "Yeah, I understand that," but then continues to disagree that his
detainer issue has been waived (R. 414:7-8). The State objects to a
continuance (R. 414:8). After the court addresses the State's objection,
defendant asks for a continuance to hire an attorney (R. 414:9). The court
grants defendant's request and sets scheduling conference for June 28, 2004
(R. 414:10; R. 129-31).
June 28,2004 - At a scheduling hearing, defendant tells the court that he has
not yet retained private counsel (R. 409:Tab 7:1). The court refers the case
to the public defender's office for appointment of conflict counsel and
schedules a hearing for July 12, 2004 (R. 409:Tab 7:1-2; R. 135-36).
July 12,2004 - Counselfromthe public defender's office appears on defendant's
behalf but notes that conflict counsel must be appointed (R. 409:Tab 8:1-2).
The prosecutor objects to any continuance (R. 409:Tab 8:2-3). After
defendant waives his right to a speedy trial, the court continues the matter
for appointment of conflict counsel (R. 409:Tab 8:6; R. 137-38).
July 14,2004 - New counsel appears on defendant's behalf and states that he
intends to file a motion to dismiss under the UMDDA (R. 409:Tab 9:1; R.
147-49,150). A hearing on defendant's motion is set for August 4,2004
(R. 409:Tab 8:3; R. 148). After discussion regarding defendant's waiver of
his 120-day disposition and speedy trial rights, the court reschedules trial
for August 24-26, 2004 (R. 148-49).
July 29,2004 - Defendant files his motion to dismiss (R. 158-59, 161-62). State
opposes the motion (R. 165-221).
Aug. 4,2004 - An evidentiary hearing is held on defendant's motion to dismiss (R.
416 (transcript); R. 222-23). Defendant and defendant's original trial
counsel testify. The court takes the matter under advisement, indicating it
will issue an oral ruling on August 13,2004 (R. 416:112; R. 222-23).
On August 13,2004, the trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss,
concluding that "[a]s of the date of the Court's ruling in this matter, August 13,2003,
[71] days of the 120-day disposition period [under the UMDDA] have expired" (R. 241
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(Conclusion 11)). The trial court made the following findings and conclusions in support
of its ruling:
May 5,2003 to June 10,2003. Thirty-eight days of the disposition period
"expired between the date that the Defendant gave notice of his request for
disposition, May 5,2003, and the date of the first scheduled Preliminary
Hearing, June 10,2003 (R. 241 (Conclusion 9)).
June 10,2003 to July 14,2003. "Due to the high number of preliminary hearings
scheduled [on June 10,2003], counsel stipulated to a continuance of the
Preliminary Hearing until July 14,2003." Thus, good cause supported a
continuance of the preliminary hearing to July 14,2003. (R. 238 (Finding
2); R. 240 (Conclusion 1)).
July 14,2003 to August 27,2003. On July 14, 2003, and July 28, 2003, defense
counsel stipulated to continuances of the preliminary hearing to "await[] a
determination by the U.S. Attorney's Office whether federal charges would
be filed against the Defendant." Those continuances, therefore, were
supported by good cause and attributable to defendant. (R. 239 (Findings 3,
4); R. 240 (Conclusions 2, 3)).
August 27,2003 to October 8,2003. On August 27, 2003, defense counsel failed
to appear for the preliminary hearing. Thus, the matter was continued to
October 8,2003. Defense counsel's "failure to appear" constituted good
cause to continue the hearing, and, therefore, such delay was attributable to
defendant (R. 239 (Finding 5); R. 240 (Conclusion 4)).
October 8,2003 to November 10,2003. Thirty-three days of the disposition
period expired between the date of the preliminary hearing on October 8,
2003, and the pretrial conference scheduled for November 10, 2003 (R. 239
(Finding 6); R. 241 (Conclusion 10)).
November 10,2003 to June 8,2004. On November 10, 2003, upon defense
counsel's motion, the trial was continued to March 24-26,2004. On
February 12, 2004, upon defendant's motion, the trial was continued to June
8-10,2004. Defendant's motions constituted good cause for the
continuances. Thus, the delay between November 10, 2003 to June 8, 2004,
was attributable to defendant (R. 239 (Findings 7, 8); R. 240-41
(Conclusions 5, 6)).
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June 8,2004 to August 24,2004. On May 24, 2004, defendant moved "to
dismiss court-appointed counsel and to retain private counsel" and "was
given 60 days to secure counsel." When defendant failed to retain counsel
by July 12, 2004, the court appointed conflict counsel. When new counsel
appeared on July 14,2004 and "informed the Court that the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss was forthcoming," the trial was continued to August 2426, 2004. Defendant's request for new counsel constituted "good cause to
delay the trial"fromJune 2004 to August 2004. Thus, such delay was
attributable to Defendant" (R. 239-40 (Finding 9); R. 241 (Conclusion 7)).
Following the trial court's ruling, defense counsel moved to continue the trial because he
was "not ready to do a trial concerning DNA" and needed "sufficient time to prepare" (R.
417:6-7). Over the prosecutor's objection, the trial court granted counsel's motion and
reset trial for December 7-9, 2004 (R. 417:7, 8,11; R. 224-26). The court found "good
cause to delay the trial" based on counsel's request for a continuance; thus, the delay
would not count toward the 120-day disposition period (R. 241 (Conclusions 8, 11)).
At the pretrial conference on November 29, 2004, defendant informed the court
that he wanted to retain private counsel. Over the prosecutor's objection, the court
allowed defense counsel to withdraw, struck the trial dates, and scheduled a hearing for
December 13, 2004 (R. 419:4-6). On December 10, 2004, the State filed a second
amended information (R. 262-68, 269-75).
When defendant appeared without counsel on December 13, 2004, the trial court
set the matter over to January 3,2005 (R. 292-93). When defendant appeared without
counsel on January 3,2005, the court set the matter over to January 24, 2005 (R. 320-21).
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On January 24,2005, new counsel appeared on defendant's behalf and asked for a
brief continuance because the parties may have reached a resolution of the case. After
defendant waived his right to a speedy trial, the court set the matter for disposition on
February 14,2005 (Jan. 24, 2005 Tr. at 4-5). On February 14, 2005, defendant entered
his Sery pleas (R. 330-31, 336-43).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I. Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA). First,
defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion without first making
express findings concerning whether the prosecutor had fulfilled her duties under the
UMDDA. Second, defendant asserts that the trial court improperly counted continuances
against defendant where, according to defendant, all the delay in the proceedings were
caused by the prosecutor's dilatory conduct.
Defendant's first claim of error fails because defendant did not raise it below, nor
did he reserve his right to appeal this claim in his Sery pleas. Thus, under wellestablished law, defendant waived this claim when he entered his guilty pleas. This
Court, therefore, should not reach defendant's claim.
Defendant's second claim fails because it is based largely on a misrepresentation
of the record. Simply stated, there is no record support for defendant's allegations that
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dilatory conduct by the prosecutor caused all of the delays in the proceedings. Because
the record does not support defendant's claim, the claim fails.
Point II. Defendant claims that his first trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to appear for the preliminary hearing on August 27,2003, and for not
filing a 120-day disposition motion to dismiss. Defendant, however, did not raise this
claim below, nor did he reserve his right to appeal the claim in his Sery pleas. Thus,
defendant waived this claim when he entered his guilty pleas, and this Court should not
reach it.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 120DAY DISPOSITION MOTION TO DISMISS, WHERE THE
RECORD SHOWS THAT GOOD CAUSE SUPPORTED THE
DELAY THAT PUSHED HIS PROCEEDINGS BEYOND THE 120DAY DISPOSITION PERIOD
Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss under the

Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act ("UMDDA"). Defendant argues, first,
that the trial court erred "as a matter of law because it failed to address the State's
statutorily imposed obligation to make a good faith effort to bring this matter to trial
within 120 days." Aplt. Br. at 27. Defendant argues, second, that the trial court erred in
attributing the majority of continuances in this case to defendant and, therefore, as not
counting toward the 120-day disposition period. See id. at 27-32.
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Defendant's first claim was not preserved by his Sery pleas and, therefore, should
not be reached. Defendant's second claim fails on its merits.2
A.

The UMDDA.
The UMDDA, now repealed, provides:

(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the
state prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and
there is pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or
information, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or
custodial officer in authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written
demand specifying the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is
pending and requesting disposition of the pending charge, he shall be
entitled to have the charge brought to trial within 120 days of the date of
delivery of written notice.
• ••

(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection
(1), the prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause
shown in open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be
granted any reasonable continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days,
or within such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his
counsel moves to dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding.
If the court finds that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the
matter heard within the time required is not supported by good cause,
whether a previous motion for continuance was made or not, the court shall
order the matter dismissed with prejudice.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (West 2004).
The UMDDA "places the burden of complying with the statute on the prosecutor."
State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 915 (Utah 1988). Thus, under the statute, "the prosecutor

2

For the Court's convenience, the State has attached copies of the relevant calendar
years at Addendum B.
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has an affirmative duty to have the defendant's matter heard within the statutory period."
Id. "Implicit in this duty is the duty to notify the court that a detainer notice has been
filed and to make a good faith effort to comply with the statute." Id.
The UMDDA, however, does not require dismissal of every case that fails to go to
trial within the statutory 120 days. Rather, a defendant's motion to dismiss may be
granted only if the trial court "finds that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the
matter heard within the time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous
motion for continuance was made or not." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4). Thus, "the
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in open court,
with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any reasonable
continuance." Id. at § 77-29-1(3). Moreover, the 120-day period may be extended by
"relatively short delay[s] caused by unforeseen problems arising immediately prior to
trial" State v. Peterson, 810 P.2d 421,426 (Utah 1991); Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(3).
In addition, the "disposition period [is] extended by the amount of time during
which defendant himself has created delay," State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah
1982), if "sufficient evidence" exists "to support a finding that, but for the defendant's
actions, the trial would have been brought within the required disposition period." State
v. Hankerson, 2005 UT 47, % 12,122 P.3d 561; accord Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916; State v.
Houston, 2003 UT App 416, ^ 11, 82 P.3d 219; State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001,
1004-05 (Utah App. 1993). This is because "when a prisoner himself acts to delay the
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trial, he indicates his willingness to temporarily waive hisrightto a speedy trial."
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916; accord Hankerson, 2005 UT 47, f 11. "[G]ood cause" created
by a defendant, therefore, may include actions by defendant such as "a plea change,"
"filing... motions to continue," "the failure to notify the court of the need to appoint new
trial counsel," and even requesting a preliminary hearing. Hankerson, 2005 UT 47, \ 10
accordBeaton, 958 P.2d at 916.
The only requirements are that, when a continuance is granted, the prosecutor "has
an affirmative obligation to ensure that good cause is 'shown in open court.'" State v.
Wagenman, 2003 UT App 146,\15, 71 P.3d 184. And the prosecutor has "an
affirmative duty to request that the trial court make its determination of good cause in
open court and to ask the court to create a record in support of its good cause
determination." Id.
Finally, a defendant's rights under the UMDDA are not always coterminous with
the length of his proceedings. First, because a defendant's rights under the UMDDA are
non-jurisdictional, see Wood v. State, 2005 UT App 483U (in UMDDA case, holding that
"[t]he right to a speedy trial is nonjurisdictional"), a defendant may waive further
assertion of his UMDDA rights at any time, "as he could any other nonjurisdictional
error." State v. Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah App. 1994) (holding that, because
speedy trial rights under related Interstate Agreement on Detainers are not jurisdictional,
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defendant may waive them). In such instances, the defendant is entitled to dismissal of
the pending charges only if the 120-day disposition period expired before his waiver.
Alternatively, a defendant's rights under the UMDDA may expire before trial if he
is releasedfromprison and, therefore, no longer "a prisoner [] serving a term of
imprisonment." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1); see also State v. Harris, 540 A.2d 395,
398 (Conn. App. 1988) (holding that intrastate statute no longer applies once defendant is
released from prison because "when a defendant is not serving a criminal sentence there
is no rehabilitation process to upset" and, thus, "no compelling reason why he should [be]
afforded a trial within the [statutory time period]"); State v. Julian, 765 P.2d 1104, 110708 (Kan. 1988) (holding that, once a defendant is released from prison, he "no longer
ha[s] the right to rely upon the speedy trial provisions of the [UMDDA]"); State v.
Oxendine, 473 A.2d 1311,1314 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (holding that UMDDA does
not apply once prisoner is released because "neither an expeditious nor a dilatory
disposition of the charges pending against him could affect his status as a prisoner");
State v. Harris, 108 S.W.3d 127, 128 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) ("Once a defendant is released
from prison within the [statutorily-defined disposition period] of the UMDD[A], he or she
loses the benefit of the statute."); and see also Cunningham v. State, 14 S.W.3d 869, 871
(Ark. 2000); Pristavec v. State, 496 A.2d 1036,1038-39 (Del. 1985); State v. Butler, 496
So. 2d 916, 917 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Dunaway v. Commonwealth, 60 S.W.3d 563,
566-69 (Ky. 2001); State v. Bellino, 557 A.2d 963, 964 (Me. 1989); State v. Burnett, 798
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A.2d 96,99 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002); State v. Dunlap, 290 S.E.2d 744, 746 (N.C.
App. 1982); State v. Thompson, 483 N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (Ohio Ct App. 1984); State v.
Foster, 812 P.2d 440,441 (Or. Ct App. 1991); State v. Smith, 353 N.W.2d 338, 341 (S.D.
1984),3 Consequently, a defendant who invokes his rights under the UMDDA but is then
released from prison is entitled to dismissal of the pending charges only if the 120-day
disposition period expired before his release.
Thus, determining whether charges should have been dismissed under the
UMDDA generally requires a two-step inquiry. See Hankerson, 2005 UT 47, % 6.
"'First, [a court] must determine when the 120-day period commenced and when it
expired. Second, if the trial was held outside the 120-day period, [the court] must then
determine whether "good cause" excused the delay.'" Id. (quoting Heaton, 958 P.2d at
916). Where, as here, defendant both waived his UMDDA rights and was released from
prison before trial, however, the second step of the inquiry is slightly modified to require
that, "if the [waiver or release occurred] outside the 120-day period, [the court] must then
determine whether 'good cause' excused the delay" up to the waiver or release. Id.

3

Although some of these cases address a defendant's rights under the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers (IAD), which governs a prisoner's right to have outstanding
charges in another state addressed, numerous courts have held that the UMDDA and the
IAD "embody like policies." People v. Higinbotham, 712 P.2d 993, 997 n.2 (Colo. 1986)
(en banc). "[B]eing component parts of the same general system they should be
construed together to the extent possible." State v. Holley, 571 A.2d 892, 895 n.5 (Md. Ct
Spec. App. 1990) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Olson,
705 P.2d 1387,1389 (Ariz. Ct App. 1985); State ex rel. Kemp v. Hodge, 629 S.W.2d 353,
356-37 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
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B.

Defendant's claim that the trial court's ruling was erroneous as
a matter of law fails where he did not expressly preserve that
claim below.

Defendant claims that the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying his motion
to dismiss. Although opaque, defendant's argument appears to be that, before the trial
court could deny his motion on its merits, the court had to expressly find that the
prosecutor had met her "statutorily imposed obligation to make a good faith effort to
bring this matter to trial within 120 days." Aplt. Br. at 27. Specifically, defendant seems
to argue, the trial court had to expressly find that the prosecutor "notified] the district
court that a detainer notice had been filed," that the prosecutor "ma[d]e a good faith effort
to bring this matter to trial within 120 days," and that the prosecutor "requested] the trial
court to make any determination of good cause for delay in open court as required under
[the UMDDA]." Id. at 26-27. Defendant's claim fails because he did not raise it, let
alone expressly preserve it, below.4
"The general rule applicable in criminal proceedings, and the cases are legion, is
that by pleading guilty," a defendant "waives all nonjurisdictional defects." State v.
Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, \ 15, 167 P.3d 1046; accord State v. Hogue, 2007 UT App 86,

4

In the course of his argument, defendant makes several allegations in support of
his claim that the prosecutor "made no effort to bring this matter to trial within 120 days."
Aplt. Br. at 26-27. These allegations, however, are not relevant to whether the trial court
erred as a matter of law in not making thefindingsconcerning the prosecutor's burdens
under the UMDDA. Thus, the State does not address defendant's allegations in this part
of its argument. The State will address defendant's allegations, instead, in the next part
of its argument, when it responds to his challenge to the trial court's good cause findings.
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f 6,157 P.3d 826. The only exception to this general rule is "where claims of error are
expressly preserved for appeal." Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ^[ 15; accord Hogue, 2007 UT
App 86, f 6; see also Utah R. Crim. P. 1 l(i). Thus, even when a defendant expressly
reserves the right to challenge a trial court's adverse ruling through a Sery plea, he may
challenge that ruling only on the bases preserved below. See Hogue, 2007 UT App 86,
f 6 (holding that defendant's reservation of right to appeal trial court's suppression ruling
did not include right to challenge qualifications of expert who testified at suppression
hearing, where defendant did not object to expert's qualifications below).
In this case, defendant never asked the trial court to make findings concerning
whether the prosecutor adequately fulfilled her burdens under the UMDDA (R. 163-64,
230-36; R. 416:4-116; R. 417:3-11). He also did not "expressly preserve[] for appeal"
this claim when he entered his Sery pleas. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61,^15. Defendant,
therefore, waived this claim when he entered his guilty pleas. See id.; Hogue, 2007 UT
App 86, Tf 6. Consequently, defendant's claim is not properly before this Court, and this
Court should refuse to reach it. See Hogue, 2007 UT App 86,16. 5

5

Even assuming defendant may raise a claim for the first time on appealfroma
Sery plea, this Court still should not reach defendant's claim here. "'Generally speaking, a
timely and specific objection must be made [at trial] in order to preserve an issue for
appeal.'" State v. Winfield 2006 UT 4, % 14,128 P.3d 1171 (quoting State v. Finder, 2005
UT 15, f 45,114 P.3d 551; citing State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11,10 P.3d 346).
"When a party raises an issue on appeal without having properly preserved the issue
below,... the party must argue either 'plain error' or 'exceptional circumstance.' "
Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ^ 14 (quoting Finder, 2005 UT 15, f 45) (additional citation and
quotation marks omitted). If a defendant "does not argue that 'exceptional
21

C.

Defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion in
ruling that good cause supported the delays in defendant's
proceedings fails where the record supports the trial court's
ruling.

Defendant claims that the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss was
erroneous because the court improperly attributed delays in the proceedings to him. See
Aplt. Br. at 27-32. According to defendant, most of those delays were either sought "to
accommodate the prosecutor" or were forced upon defendant by "dilatory conduct on the
part of the State." Id. at 27,29. Defendant's claim, which relies heavily on
misrepresentations of the record, lacks merit.

circumstances' or 'plain error' justifies review of the issue," this Court will "decline to
consider it on appeal." State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995); see also
Finder, 2005 UT 15, f 45. In this case, defendant does not argue either exceptional
circumstances or plain error. See Aplt. Br. at 23-32. Thus, this Court should "decline to
consider [defendant's claim] on appeal." Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 n.5.
Even on its merits, defendant's claim fails. To establish plain error, defendant
must show that '"(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial
court; and (iii) the error was harmful.'" State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, TJ16, 94
P.3d 186 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993)). "To establish
that the error should have been obvious to the trial court, [defendant] must show that the
law governing the error was clear at the time the alleged error was made." State v. Dean,
2004 UT 63, K 16, 95 P.3d 276; see also State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 786 (Utah 1992);
State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah 1989); State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 805 (Utah
App. 1998); State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App. 1997). In this case, defendant
does not cite a single legal authority clearly requiring a trial court to make the findings he
now claims the court should have made. See Aplt. Br. at 23-32. Thus, even assuming
arguendo that the trial court erred in not making those findings, defendant has not shown
that the error was obvious. See Dean, 2004 UT 63, f 16; Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786;
Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 36; Baker, 963 P.2d at 805; Ross, 951 P.2d at 239. Thus, defendant
has not shown plain error.
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As stated, determining whether charges should have been dismissed under the
UMDDA generally requires a two-step inquiry. See Hankerson, 2005 UT 47, \ 6.
"'First, [a court] must determine when the 120-day period commenced and when it
expired. Second, if the trial was held outside the 120-day period, [the court] must then
determine whether "good cause" excused the delay.'" Id. (quoting Heaton, 958 P.2d at
916). This Court reviews a trial court's ruling for abuse of discretion and "'will find
abuse of discretion where there is no reasonable basis in the record to support the trial
court's Speedy Trial Statute determination of "good cause.'"" Houston, 2003 UT App
416, f 7 (quoting Coleman, 2001 UT App 281,13, abrogated on other grounds, State v.
Hankerson, 2005 UT 47,ffl[9, 12,122 P.3d 561 )(additional citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
The 120-day period in this case began on May 5,2003, when the Utah State Prison
received defendant's 120-day disposition request (R. 21). Absent any extensions for good
cause, therefore, the 120-day period expired on August 31, 2003.6 Because a trial was not
held by August 31, 2003, this Court must proceed to the second step in the UMDDA
analysis, determining whether "good cause" excused the delay.
In this case, however, defendant's 120-day disposition period expired when he
waived his UMDDA rights on November 10,2003 (R. 412:5-6). See Brocksmith, 888

6

Although the parties agreed, and the trial court found, that the 120-day disposition
period expired on September 3,2003, the State's calculations on appeal indicate that the
period expired on August 31,2003.
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P.2d at 705; Wood, 2005 UT App 483U. Alternatively, the disposition period expired
when defendant was released from prison on January 13,2004 (R. 409:Tab 5:1; R. 81-82;
PSI at 7). See Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1); Cunningham, 14 S.W.3d at 871; Harris, 540
A.2d at 398; Pristavec, 496 A.2d at 1038-39; Butler, 496 So. 2d at 917; Julian, 765 P.2d
at 1107-08; Dunaway, 60 S.W.3d at 566-69; Bellino, 557 A.2d at 964; Oxendine, 473
A.2d at 1314; Harris, 108 S.W.3d at 128; Burnett, 798 A.2d at 99; Dunlap, 290 S.E.2d at
746; Thompson, 483 N.E.2d at 1210; Foster, 812 P.2d at 441; Smith, 353 N. W.2d at 341.
Thus, the only question before this Court is whether good cause existed to extend
defendant's proceedings beyond November 10,2003, or, in the alternative, January 13,
2004. In this case, the trial court properly ruled that good cause justified the delay of
defendant's proceedings beyond both of those dates.
1.

June 10, 2003 continuance.

Defendant claims that the trial court erred in ruling that good cause supported the
continuance of the preliminary hearing on June 10, 2003. See Aplt. Br. at 27, 29.
According to defendant, the continuance should have counted toward the 120-day
disposition period because it was both "requested by the prosecutor" and granted "to
accommodate the prosecutor because the State had 13-14 witnesses." Aplt. Br. at 27
(citing R. 409:1); see also id. at 29-30 (citing R. 409:2).
Nothing in the record, however, establishes the prosecutor as the originator of the
continuance motion. The minute entryfromJune 10 does not identify the moving party.
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Rather, it merely states that, "[b]ased on the cal[e]nd[a]r being so full today, counsel
request this preliminary hearing be set over as a special setting, as the state has 11 victims
that need to testify" (R. 24-25). Nor does the transcript of the June 10 hearing clearly
establish the moving party. To the extent it gives any hint, however, the transcript shows
that it was defense counsel, not the prosecutor, who presented the motion to the trial court
(R. 409:1). And, at the evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss, both
defendant's former counsel and the prosecutor merely stated that the continuance was one
to which both parties had stipulated (R. 416:62,104-05; R. 417:4).
Moreover, nothing in the record supports defendant's contention that the
continuance was granted solely "to accommodate the prosecutor." Aplt. Br. at 27, 29. As
stated, the minute entryfromthe June 10 hearing merely states that, "[b]ased on the
cal[e]nd[a]r being so full today, counsel request this preliminary hearing be set over as a
special setting, as the state has 11 victims that need to testify" (R. 24-25). And defense
counsel testified at the motion hearing that both counsel had requested a continuance not,
as defendant claims, "to accommodate the prosecutor because the State had 13-14
witnesses," Aplt. Br. at 27, but simply because there "wasn't enough time to do the
hearing" that day (R. 416:62).
In sum, the record shows that the June 10 continuance was granted at both parties'
request because, as a practical matter, there just "wasn't enough time to do the hearing"
on that day (R. 416:62). This record constitutes a "reasonable basis . . . to support the
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trial court's Speedy Trial Statute determination of 'good cause.'" Houston, 2003 UT App
416, Tf 7 (citations omitted). Thus, defendant's challenge to the trial court's determination
fails.
2.

July 14,2003 and July 28,2003 continuances.

Defendant also challenges the trial court's determinations that good cause
supported the July 14,2003 and July 28,2003 continuances of his preliminary hearing.
Aplt. Br. at 26 (citing R. 24-25, 26-29). According to defendant, the record does not
support these rulings "because the State sought stipulation[s]" to continue the hearing
"and then passively waited for the federal government to bring charges against Mr.
Larson." Id.
Again, nothing in the record supports defendant's claim that the State was the sole
party seeking these continuances. In fact, neither of the minute entries cited by defendant
in support of his claim identify the party who moved for the continuances. See id. (citing
R. 26-29). Moreover, transcripts from the July 14 and the July 28 hearings identify
defense counsel as the moving party, to see whether the federal government was going to
charge defendant in this matter (R. 409:Tab2:l; R. 409:Tab 3:1). And, although the
prosecutor indicated at the hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss that the continuances
were in part for her benefit to "determin[e] what jurisdiction a particular criminal episode
. . . is going to be heard under" (R. 416:105), defense counsel also indicated that the
continuances would benefit his client (R. 409:Tab 3:1). As defense counsel explained at
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the July 28 hearing, if the federal government decided to charge defendant, "the State [is]
going to dismiss on this" (Id).
Finally, nothing in the record supports defendant's contention that, after the
continuances were granted, the prosecutor "passively waited for the federal government
to bring charges against [defendant]." Aplt. Br. at 26 (citing R. 26-29). The minute
entries cited by defendant do not address the issue and, thus, lend no support for his
claim. More importantly, the transcripts from July 14 and July 28 directly contradict it.
On July 14, when defense counsel requested the first continuance, the prosecutor
specifically stated that she had "been pretty aggressive with the U.S. Attorney's office to
try to get them to make a decision" and that she would "call [the] U.S. Attorney... again
today" (R. 409:Tab 2:1). And, on July 28, when defense counsel requested the second
continuance, the prosecutor again stated that she had "been diligently trying to get an
answerfromthe U.S. Attorney's Office and I'm going to continue to do that" (R.
409:Tab3:l).
In sum, nothing in the record supports defendant's claims that the prosecutor
sought the July 14 and July 28 continuances and then passively prolonged those delays.
To the contrary, the record shows that both parties sought the continuances for the
reasonable purpose of determining whether the federal government was going to pursue
charges against defendant; and the record shows that the prosecutor aggressively sought a
determination by the federal government of that issue. Again, therefore, the record
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provides a "reasonable basis . . . to support the trial court's Speedy Trial Statute
determination^] of 'good cause'" as to each of the continuances. Houston, 2003 UT App
416, f 7 (citations omitted). Thus, defendant's challenge to the trial court's
determinations fail.
3.

August 27,2003 continuance.

Defendant next challenges the trial court's ruling that good cause supported the
continuance of the preliminary hearing on August 27, 2003, when defense counsel failed
to appear. See Aplt. Br. at 30. In challenging the court's ruling, defendant focuses
specifically on the magistrate's determination that the absence of defense counsel
constituted a waiver of defendant's 120-day disposition rights. See id. According to
defendant, the conclusion "that an attorney can waive a defendant's right to a speedy trial
over his client's objection is incorrect as a matter of law." Id. Defendant's claim fails for
at least two reasons.
First, defendant's claim fails because it is inadequately briefed. Rule 24(a)(9),
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides that a defendant's brief "shall contain . . .
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Under this rule, "a
reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited
and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of
argument and research." State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, \ 20, 63 P.3d 72 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, "[i]mplicitly," this rule "requires not just bald
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citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that
authority." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). And, because this Court
"will not engage in constructing arguments 'out of whole cloth5 on behalf of defendants,"
State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 72 n.2 (Utah App. 1990), when a defendant fails to present
any relevant authority, this Court will "decline to find it for him," State v. Pritchett, 2003
UT 24, % 12, 69 P.3d 1278. Rather, this Court will simply "decline to considered
inadequately briefed arguments." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 1998).
In this case, defendant does not cite any legal authority supporting his claim that
the magistrate's ruling was "incorrect as a matter of law." Aplt. Br. at 30. Thus,
defendant's claim is inadequately briefed. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); Pritchett, 2003
UT 24,1| 12; Gomez, 2002 UT 120,1f 20; Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305; Webb, 790 P.2d at 72
n.2. This Court, therefore, should decline to reach it. See Bryant, 965 P.2d at 549.
Second, defendant's claim fails because the trial court's ruling concerning the
August 27,2003 continuance was not based on defense counsel's waiver of defendant's
UMDDArights.(R. 240) Rather, it was based on its determination that "[t]here was good
cause to delay the Preliminary Hearing" due to "defense counsel's failure to appear" (Id).
And, whether or not the magistrate properly ruled that defense counsel's failure to appear
constituted a waiver of defendant's UMDDA, resolution of that issue does not undermine
the reasonableness of the trial court's good cause determination.
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Defense counsel's failure to appear at the August 27 preliminary hearing was an
"unforseen problemf]." Peterson, 810 P.2d at 426 (holding that trial court may find good
cause where "relatively short delay[s] [are] caused by unforeseen problems arising
immediately prior to trial"). Where defendant had the right to counsel at his preliminary
hearing, the magistrate's decision to continue the hearing so that counsel could be present
was not only reasonable, but—unless defendant was willing to waive his right to counsel,
which he never indicated he was willing to do—absolutely necessary. See, e.g., State v.
Curry, 2006 UT App 390, f 9 & n.3, 147 P.3d 483 (holding that "[c]ritical stages of a
criminal proceeding" at which defendant has constitutional right to counsel "include . . .
preliminary hearing); see also State v. Bullock, 699 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah 1985) (holding
that good cause supported trial court's continuance of trial over defendant's objection,
"where defense counsel was ill on the date scheduled for trial"); State v. Trujillo, 656
P.2d 403,404 (Utah 1982) (per curiam) (holding that good cause supported continuance
of trial, where trial "was continued only because of the complication resulting from the
co-defendant['s] change of plea at the last minute").
Thus, defendant's contention that the trial court erred in finding good cause for the
August 27 continuance of his preliminary hearing lacks merit.
4.

Continuances granted between November 10,2003 and August 13,
2004.

Finally, defendant claims that the trial court erred in ruling that the November 10,
2003 and February 20, 2004 continuances of his trial were supported by good cause. See
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Aplt. Br. at 26,28-31. According to defendant, these delays were caused solely by the
prosecutor, who refused to provide "critical DNA evidence to the defense ..., thereby
making it impossible for Mr. Larson to proceed to trial." Aplt. Br. at 31.7
Defendant, however, waived his future rights to a 120-day disposition at the
November 10,2003 hearing (R. 412:5-6). Thus, this Court need not determine whether
good cause supported either of the continuances at issue. Rather, because 120 days had
not expired by November 10,2003, this Court may simply affirm the trial court's denial
of defendant's dismissal motion.
Alternatively, defendant's rights to a 120-day disposition expired when he was
releasedfromprison on January 13,2004 (R. 409:Tab 5:1; R. 81-82; PSI at 7). See Utah
Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1); Cunningham, 14 S.W.3d at 871; Harris, 540 A.2d at 398;
Pristavec, 496 A.2d at 1038-39; Butler, 496 So. 2d at 917; Julian, 765 P.2d at 1107-08;
Dunaway, 60 S.W.3d at 566-69; Bellino, 557 A.2d at 964; Oxendine, 473 A.2d at 1314;
Harris, 108 S.W.3d at 128; Burnett, 798 A.2d at 99; Dunlap, 290 SJE.2d at 746;
Thompson, 483 N.E.2d at 1210; Foster, 812 P.2d at 441; Smith, 353 N.W.2d at 341.

7

Although defendant does not specify these two continuances in his argument, see
Aplt. Br. at 30-32, these are the only two continuances granted after defendant's
preliminary hearing that were caused by defense counsel's need for DNA evidence (R.
412:3-4; R. 413:11-13,14). The remaining continuances were granted because defendant
sought to dismiss appointed counsel in favor of private counsel (R. 414:3-5, 9; R.
409:Tab 7:1-2), and then was appointed conflict counsel (R. 409:Tab 8:1-3; R. 145-46).
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Thus, this Court need address only defendant's challenge to the November 10,2003
continuance.
In any case, defendant's challenges to the trial court's rulings lack merit.
Defendant's waiver claim. Defendant first argues that the trial court's rulings were
erroneous because, on both November 10,2003 and February 20,2004, the trial court
"coerced and forced [him] to waive his [120-day disposition] right by unjustly placing
him in the impossible position of giving up his speedy trial remedy or going to trial
unprepared." Aplt. Br. at 30-31. The trial court's rulings concerning these continuances,
however, were not based on defendant's waiver of his UMDDA rights (R. 240-41).
Rather, the court's rulings were based on defense counsel's requests for continuances
(Id.). Consequently, defendant's argument addresses an issue that was irrelevant to the
trial court's rulings. And, because it was irrelevant, this Court need not reach it.
Moreover, defendant never challenged the validity of his waivers below (R. 16364,230-36; R. 416:4-116; R. 417:3-11). Thus, the argument he now raises wras not
"expressly preserved for appeal" by his Sery pleas. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ^ 15.
Consequently, defendant's argument is not properly before this Court, and this Court
should refuse to reach it. See Hogue, 2007 UT App 86, f 6.8

8

Even if this Court were to reach defendant's claim, the claim would fail. Because
defendant did not raise this claim below, he was required to argue "that 'exceptional
circumstances' or 'plain error' justifies review of the issue." Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229
n.5; Pinder, 2005 UT 15, H 45. Because defendant does not argue either of these
doctrines, see Aplt. Br. at 31-32, this Court should "decline to consider [defendant's
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Defendant's good cause claim. Alternatively, defendant argues that the trial
court's rulings were erroneous because the continuances granted on November 10,2003
and February 20,2004 were caused solely by the prosecutor, who refused to provide
"critical DNA evidence to the defense ..., thereby making it impossible for Mr. Larson to
proceed to trial." Aplt. Br. at 31; see also id. at 26, 28-29. Specifically, defendant asserts
that, "[a]t the time of the October 8,2003 preliminary hearing, which was well beyond the
initial 120 days, the State had not even provided a copy of the crime lab report to the

claim] on appeal." Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 n.5; Pinder, 2005 UT 15, \ 45.
Alternatively, defendant's claim fails because he has not shown plain error. As
stated, to show that an error should have been obvious, defendant "must show that the law
governing the error was clear at the time the alleged error was made." Dean, 2004 UT
63,f16. Here, defendant cites only one casefroma foreign jurisdiction to support his
contention that a court may not force a defendant to waive his rights to a speedy trial in
return for a continuance requested because his trial counsel is unprepared for trial. See
Aplt. Br. at 31 (citing Hunt v. Mitchell, 261 F.3d 575, 584 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that
trial court deprived defendant of right to effective assistance of counsel when, after
appointing counsel just minutes before trial, court forced defendant to either waive
statutory right to speedy trial or proceed to trial with unprepared counsel; suggesting that
"element of coerced choice" between constitutional right to counsel and statutory right to
speedy trial was "'intolerable'")). A single decision by a foreign court, however, does not
establish "that the law governing the error was clear at the time the alleged error was
made." Dean, 2004 UT 63, Tf 16. This is especially so where the court in Hunt relied on a
Fourth Amendment case—Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), in which the
Supreme Court held that a defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing could not be
used against him at trial—that the Supreme Court itself has essentially limited to its facts.
See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 210-13 (1971) (distinguishing Simmons
from cases in which "we held the defendants bound by 'waivers' of [constitutional] rights
. . . made in order to avoid burdens which, it was ultimately determined, could not
constitutionally have been imposed"). And, this is especially so where defendant here—
because he waived his right to a speedy trial, not his right to effective assistance of
counsel—was not forced to go to trial, as was Hunt, with unprepared counsel.
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defense." Aplt. Br. at 28 (citing R. 416:74). Then, "[w]hen defense counsel requested
the DNA evidencefromthe prosecutor..., the prosecutor not only would not provide it
but told defense counsel he had to obtain that evidence by subpoenaing the crime lab."
Id. at 28-29 (citing R. 416:76-77). And, defendant claims, "[w]hen defense counsel did
so, the state crime lab responded with a letter delaying the matter even further, stating 'it
was going to take them sometime to get the information together.'" Id. at 29 (citing R.
416:76-77). Defendant concludes that, "[b]ecause this information had already been
provided to the prosecutor and admitted at the preliminary hearing, this dilatory conduct
on the part of the State was unwarranted and it served only to unnecessarily delay
[defendant's] trial even further." Id.
Again, however, defendant never claimed below that the continuances in his trial
were caused by the prosecution's withholding of DNA evidence (R. 163-64, 230-36; R.
416:4-116; R. 417:3-11). Consequently, defendant's claim was not preserved in his Sery
plea, and this Court should refuse to reach it. See Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, f 15; Hogue,
2007 UTApp 86,^6.
In any case, the record does not support defendant's claim. First, nothing in the
record supports defendant's claim that "the State had not even provided a copy of the
crime lab report to the defense" by the time of defendant's preliminary hearing. Aplt. Br.
at 28. As support for his claim, defendant cites defense counsel's testimony from the
hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss. See id. (citing R. 416:74). To the extent
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counsel's testimony sheds any light on the matter, however, the testimony indicates that,
indeed, defense counsel had gotten the DNA report "from the State" early in the process
(R. 416:74). And, counsel's testimony is consistent with his request for discovery, filed
on or about April 28, 2003, which included a request for "[a]ny reports or results of
scientific tests taken during the investigation of this case" (R. 16).
As defense counsel explained, the problem was that, to prepare for trial, defense
counsel wanted not only the report, but the "hard data" underlying the report (R. 416:73).
And, contrary to defendant's claim, nothing in the record suggests that "this information
had... been provided to the prosecutor and admitted at the preliminary hearing." Aplt.
Br. at 29. The only DNA evidence presented at the preliminary hearing was the crime
lab's DNA report; nothing in the preliminary hearing transcript suggests that the State had
any other DNA evidence at that time (R. 411:84).
Nor does anything in the record suggest, as defendant does, that the prosecutor was
"dilatory" in providing that "hard data," once defendant requested it. Rather, the record
establishes only that the prosecutor advised defendant to follow the apparently normal
course for obtaining that evidence—which was to request itfromthe body that had it, the
crime lab. As defense counsel testified, he had three DNA cases at the time and he "made
a request, a supplemental motion request to the District Attorney's Office in all three
cases and got the same—basically the same response in all three, was that I had to ask the
crime lab" (R. 416:76) (emphasis added).
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Next, defendant cites the crime lab's letter "saying it was going to take them
sometime to get the information together" as evidence of "dilatory conduct on the part of
the [prosecutor]" that "was unwarranted and... served only to unnecessarily delay [his]
trial even further." Aplt. Br. at 29. However, defendant provides no evidence to support
his accusation. Aplt. Br. at 29. Specifically, there is no record evidence establishing how
long it normally takes the crime lab to produce the "hard data" underlying a DNA report.
Thus, there is also no record evidence supporting defendant's contention that the delay
caused by the crime lab was either "unwarranted" or "unnecessar[y]." Aplt. Br. at 29.
Finally, to the extent defendant's accusations imply that the prosecutor had a duty
under the UMDDA to anticipate defendant's DNA defense, to do all the discovery
necessary to prepare that defense, and to have that discovery ready in the event defendant
requested it, such a duty far exceeds the State's duty to disclose evidence in a typical
criminal case. See Pinder, 2005 UT 15,fflf22-27 (holding that State's duty to disclose
evidence in criminal case requires only disclosure that evidence exists and where it may
be found, not disclosure of evidence itself). And defendant cites absolutely no legal
authority suggesting that the UMDDA imposes such a burden on the prosecutor. See
Aplt. Br. at 25-32.
Defendant's challenge to the trial court's rulings that good cause supported delay
in defendant's trial on November 10,2003 and February 20,2004, therefore, fails.
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In conclusion, defendant has not demonstrated any error in the trial court's ruling
that good cause supported the delays of defendant's proceedings. Defendant's challenge
to the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss based on those delays, therefore, fails.
H.

THIS COURT MAY NOT REACH DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM WHERE HE DID NOT RAISE
IT BELOW OR RESERVE IT IN HIS SERYFLEAS
Defendant claims that his first trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by

failing to appear at the August 27, 2003 preliminaiy hearing and failing to file a motion to
dismiss under the UMDDA. See Aplt. Br. at 34. Defendant, however, did not raise an
ineffective assistance claim below or reserve it as an issue for appeal when he entered his
Sery pleas. Consequently, defendant's claim is not properly before this Court, and this
Court should refuse to reach it.
As stated, "[t]he general rule applicable in criminal proceedings, and the cases are
legion, is that by pleading guilty," a defendant "waives all nonjurisdictional defects."
State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, % 15, 167 P.3d 1046; accord State v. Hogue, 2007 UT
App 86, Tf 6. The only exception to this general rule is "where claims of error are
expressly preserved for appeal." Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, % 15; accord Hogue, 2007 UT
App 86, f 6; see also Utah R. Crim. P. 1 l(i). Thus, even when a defendant expressly
preserves the right to challenge a trial court's adverse ruling through a Sery plea, he may
challenge that ruling only on the bases preserved below. See Hogue, 2007 UT App 86,
f 6 (holding that defendant's reservation of right to appeal trial court's suppression ruling
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did not include right to raise for the first time on appeal ineffective assistance of counsel
claim based in counsel's failure to challenge qualifications of expert who testified at
suppression hearing).
In this case, defendant never raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
below (R. 163-64,230-36; R. 416:4-116; R. 417:3-11). He also did not "expressly
preserve[] for appeal" an ineffective assistance claim. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, \ 15.
Defendant, therefore, waived this claim when he entered his guilty pleas. Id.; see also
Hogue, 2007 UT App 86, f 6.
Consequently, defendant's claim is not properly before this Court, and this Court
should refuse to reach it. See Hogue, 2007 UT App 86, f 6.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully asks this Court to affirm the trial
court's ruling on defendant's 120-day disposition motion and to affirm defendant's
convictions.
Respectfully submitted this Itfiday of April, 2008.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

KARENA.KLUCZNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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Addendum A

Addendum A

76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing
robbery, he: ^ »
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily iiyury upon another; or
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the
course of committing a robbery* if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a
robbery.

77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Continuance may be granted — Dismissal of charge for
failure to bring to trial.
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting
disposition of thg pending charge, he shall he entitled to have the charge
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice.
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified,
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested.
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any
reasonable continuance.
(4) £ri the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to
dismiss the action* the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the
time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with
prejudice;
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